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The log

Anything that produced a CSV will do: an EVTX conversion, a SIEM export, a Get-WinEvent pipeline. Accounts ending in a dollar sign are computers rather than people and are left out, because there are tens of thousands of them and they bury everything that matters. A domain’s authentication log is a complete map of who can reach what; this one is read here and goes nowhere.

What the log has in it

Reaching many hosts at once

The baseline is everything before the last few days; the test is everything after. A row marked new ground reached hosts it had never reached in the baseline, and that is the finding: an administrator who logs into forty servers every day is not interesting, the forty-first is. Almost every tool gets this backwards by alerting on volume, which is why they get switched off within a fortnight.

The logon types in this log

The whole analysis


    
How it works

LOGON reads Windows logon events and finds the account that went somewhere it had never been before. It highlights new ground rather than volume, flags NTLM use, and tells password spraying apart from brute force. It points a person at what to check. The logs stay in this tab.

The guide: How to spot malware beaconing in a connection log

Questions people ask about LOGON

Why is new ground the finding rather than volume?

Because volume is what legitimate infrastructure looks like. A backup agent, a vulnerability scanner and a management service each touch every host in the estate every night, using network logons, at three in the morning, and they will sit at the top of any fan-out table you build. Alerting on that produces a page of the same four service accounts every day until somebody turns it off. What cannot be explained that way is an account reaching a host it has never reached before, and the page splits the log into a baseline and a tested period precisely so it can tell you which.

What makes NTLM worth looking at?

Inside a domain, a machine addressed by its name should authenticate with Kerberos. A stolen password hash cannot obtain a Kerberos ticket, so an attacker holding one has to fall back to NTLM, which means passing a hash leaves NTLM logons where Kerberos ones ought to be. The complication is that so does a decade-old line-of-business application, a hard-coded IP address, and a handful of appliances. That is why the page counts NTLM per account and shows you the hosts rather than raising an alert on it.

What is the difference between a spray and a brute force?

A spray is one password tried against many accounts, which tells you the attacker has a password and is looking for whose it is: usually a common one, usually from outside, usually with only two or three attempts per account so nothing locks out. A brute force is many passwords against one account, which tells you they already have an account name they care about. Those are different stages of an intrusion and imply different things about what the attacker already knew, and counting failed logons in aggregate throws the distinction away.

Why are computer accounts left out?

Because a domain generates tens of thousands of them, they authenticate constantly and automatically, and including them means the interesting rows are never on the first page. Anything ending in a dollar sign is a machine rather than a person and is counted and set aside. If you are chasing something that specifically used a machine account, which does happen, take the dollar signs off the column before loading it.

What does logon type 9 actually mean?

That a process kept its own identity locally but used different credentials for anything it did over the network. The ordinary way to produce one is runas /netonly, which a sysadmin might genuinely do, and the less ordinary way is most of the credential theft tooling in existence. They are rare enough in a normal estate that the page lists them individually instead of counting them, because the right thing to do with each one is read it.

Will this tell me an account is compromised?

No. Every shape on this page has an innocent explanation that is more common than the guilty one, and there is nothing in a logon record that separates an administrator doing their job from somebody using that administrator’s credentials. What the page does is reduce a log nobody could read to a handful of rows worth opening, in the order worth opening them. The judgement is yours and cannot be anybody else’s.

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