What this domain actually is HOMOGLYPH
There is no rendering of these two strings in which you can tell them apart, because the difference is in the bytes and the bytes are not on the screen.
The domains
Nothing here is resolved and no request of any kind is made. That matters more than it sounds: a domain under investigation is live infrastructure, and typing it into a checker tells that checker what is being investigated, and sometimes it tells the attacker.
The names it might be imitating
Each domain is reduced to a skeleton: every confusable character mapped to the one it imitates, marks stripped, and the pairs that impersonate a single letter folded in, so rn becomes m. Two names that reduce to the same skeleton look the same however different their bytes are.
What each one actually is
Every character is shown with its code point underneath. A character outside plain ASCII, or one that renders as nothing, is marked, and an invisible one is drawn as ␣ so there is something to point at.
The analysis
How it works
Some fake domains look identical to the real one because a letter has been swapped for a lookalike from another alphabet, and the difference is in the bytes, not on the screen. HOMOGLYPH shows what a domain really is: each character, which alphabet it comes from, its skeleton form, and tricks like rn standing in for m. It works offline and never looks the domain up, so checking a suspicious link does not visit it.
The guide: How to find generated domains in a DNS log
Questions people ask about HOMOGLYPH
Why can I not just look at the domain?
Because there is nothing to look at. U+0430, the Cyrillic small letter a, is drawn identically to the Latin one in essentially every typeface in existence: not similarly, identically. No font size, no zoom and no amount of care will separate them, because the difference exists only in the bytes. Browsers try to help by showing the punycode for suspicious names, but each browser has its own rules and each set has known bypasses. In a log file, a terminal or an email header there is no help at all.
Why does it not look the domain up?
Because looking it up is an action with consequences. A domain in an investigation is usually live infrastructure, and resolving it, fetching it or submitting it to a reputation service announces that somebody is looking: to the service, and in the case of a DNS lookup or an HTTP request, often to whoever runs the domain. This page examines the string and only the string, and makes no network request of any kind.
What is a skeleton?
The idea from Unicode’s own security annex: map every character to the one it is confusable with, so a name reduces to a canonical shape. Then “does this look like my brand” becomes a string comparison rather than a judgement. The table here covers the characters somebody would actually use to imitate a-z and 0-9, and it is written out in full in the source rather than generated, so what the page knows about is exactly what you can read.
Is a mixed-script label always an attack?
Almost always deliberate and almost never legitimate, but “almost” is doing real work there. Scripts get mixed innocently in places with more than one writing system in daily use, and a brand may deliberately use a character from another script as a stylistic choice. What is close to conclusive is a label that is ordinary Latin except for one or two characters from another script sitting exactly where they imitate Latin ones. That is not a language; that is a choice.
Why does rn become m?
Because a character-by-character map cannot see it. Two characters imitating a single one (rn for m, vv for w, cl for d) defeat any table that works one character at a time, and rnicrosoft.com is a real and repeatedly used attack that contains no unusual characters whatsoever. Those pairs are folded after the per-character mapping, which is why the skeleton catches them.
How does it decide what the registrable domain is?
Roughly, from a short list of two-part suffixes like co.uk and com.au, and the page says so rather than pretending otherwise. A complete public suffix list runs to thousands of entries and goes out of date; for telling a lookalike from a legitimate name the shortcut is almost always enough, and knowing where it stops is worth more than a false impression that it does not.
Doing this often? The Sovereign Console pulls every domain, address and indicator out of a whole case, and exports a report. On its own, US$2 a month; with everything else, US$5 a month or US$48 a year.