Check the signature on a download SIGIL
A download comes with a signature so anyone can check it is the file the publisher signed. Give the file, the signature and the signer's public key, and this checks it here.
The file
The download itself, as it arrived. Any kind of file, any size.
The signature
Paste it, or drop the signature file anywhere on this panel.
The signer's public key
Paste the key, or drop the key file anywhere on this panel.
What the signature says
How it works
Why almost nobody checks a signature
A download page prints a signature so that anybody can confirm the file is the one the publisher signed. It is a genuinely strong guarantee, and the proportion of people who ever check one is close to zero.
The reason is entirely practical. Checking means installing
gpg, or minisign, or working out the right
ssh-keygen -Y verify incantation with the right allowed
signers file; and for GnuPG it usually also means importing a key,
understanding what the resulting warning about trust actually means, and
deciding that the warning is fine. By the time all that is done the file
has been installed for twenty minutes.
So this reads the three formats a download page hands out and checks them here, in the tab, with the browser's own cryptography. The file is hashed a chunk at a time in a worker, so a multi-gigabyte image can be checked without being held in memory.
The three formats
- minisign: two base64 lines: an algorithm
marker, an eight-byte key id and a 64-byte Ed25519 signature, then a
trusted comment and a second signature over the first signature and that
comment. The
EDvariant signs the BLAKE2b-512 of the file rather than the file, and because no browser exposes BLAKE2b, that is implemented here. - SSHSIG: OpenSSH's own format. What is actually signed is the magic string, the namespace, a reserved string, the hash name and the hash of the file, each length-prefixed. Getting that construction right is the whole job; a verifier that hashes the file and checks the signature against it will reject every valid signature in existence.
- OpenPGP: RFC 4880 and RFC 9580, armoured or binary: old and new packet headers, partial lengths, the CRC-24 on the armour, version 4 and version 6 signature packets with their hashed subpackets and trailer, key packets and subkeys with their binding signatures, and RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA and Ed25519 with their multiprecision integers.
The public-key arithmetic is the browser's own, through
crypto.subtle. Where a signature's algorithm hashes
internally and WebCrypto will only accept one buffer, the file is read
into memory up to two gigabytes and refused in plain words beyond that,
rather than failing in a way you would have to guess at.
A valid signature answers a narrower question than people think
“This signature is valid” means: whoever holds that private key signed these exact bytes. It does not mean the file is safe, it does not mean the publisher is trustworthy, and above all it does not mean the key is the publisher's.
That last one is where the whole scheme turns. If the key came from the same page as the download, an attacker who could replace the file could replace the key, and both would verify perfectly. A signature is only worth the independence of the key: from the project's repository, a distribution's keyring, a key you have checked before, a fingerprint published somewhere the attacker does not control. This shows you the key id and the signing time so you can compare them against a source of your own choosing, which is the step that actually does the work.
When there is no signature and only a published hash, CHECKSUM is the right tool and answers a weaker question. CERTLENS reads the certificate on the site you downloaded from, and PROVENANCE records what you received and when, for a file that has to be accounted for later.
Questions people ask about SIGIL
What does a valid signature actually prove?
That the file on your disk is byte for byte the file the holder of that key signed, and that nothing changed on the way. It does not prove who holds the key, that the person behind it is who the download page says, that the key was not stolen, or that the software inside is safe to run. It ties the file to a key; tying the key to a person is a separate job, done by comparing the fingerprint with one published somewhere the publisher controls.
Which formats does it read?
minisign signatures (.minisig), including the prehashed kind that signs a BLAKE2b-512 of the file; OpenSSH signatures made with ssh-keygen -Y sign (the SSHSIG format); and OpenPGP signatures, armoured .asc or binary .sig, detached, cleartext-signed or a signed message. Keys: a minisign public key line, an ssh-ed25519, ssh-rsa or ecdsa-sha2-nistp line, or an OpenPGP public key block.
What can it not check?
DSA and Ed448, because no browser can do the arithmetic; SSH security-key (FIDO) signatures, which carry a counter and flags this does not read; brainpool and secp256k1 curves; encrypted messages; and X.509 certificates and PEM keys, which are CERTLENS’s job. A signature it cannot check is said so in words, never passed off as valid.
Is the file uploaded?
No. The file is hashed in a background thread on this device, the signature is checked with the browser’s own cryptography, and no request leaves the page. It works with the network switched off, and a file of any size is read a slice at a time rather than held in memory.
It says the signature does not check. What now?
Download the file again, from the publisher’s own address rather than a mirror, and check it again. A file that fails twice is not the file that was signed. If the wording says the signature was made with another key, the key pasted is not the signer’s, which is what you would see if the download page and the key came from the same compromised place.
Why does it show the file’s SHA-256?
Because many projects publish a SHA256SUMS line beside the download, and a signature over a checksum file only helps if the checksum matches your copy. The hash shown is of the file you gave, so you can compare it with the published one by eye. CHECKSUM does the same job on its own if there is no signature to check.
It shows a name on the key. Can I trust it?
No. A user id on an OpenPGP key is text the key’s owner typed, and a comment on an SSH or minisign key is unsigned. Anyone can make a key that says anything. The fingerprint is the part worth comparing, which is why it is printed in full and why there is a box to paste the published one into.
Is there a size limit?
Not for the usual case: the file is streamed through the hash in eight-megabyte slices. Two kinds do need the whole file in memory, because WebCrypto hashes internally and takes one buffer: the older minisign kind that signs the file rather than its hash, and OpenPGP RSA and ECDSA signatures. Those are capped at two gigabytes, and above it the page says so rather than crashing the tab.
Doing this often? The OBSCURA Sovereign Suite signs your own releases, so others can prove a download came from you unchanged. On its own, US$2 a month; with everything else, US$5 a month or US$48 a year.